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Abstract 
 
There is a dearth of research on the determinants of in-kind redistribution. 
Using dynamic panel data estimations for 32 OECD countries, we show that 
the in-kind share of social benefits is lower under left-wing governments. This 
effect is weakened when left-wing governments respond to inflation by 
increasing the share of in-kind transfers. 
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1. Introduction 
The theoretical public finance literature offers various explanations why social benefits are provided 
in-kind rather than in cash even though in-kind transfers create consumption distortions. These 
arguments mostly draw on paternalism, self-selection, and political economy considerations. In 
contrast, Currie and Gahvari (2008) point out “the limited empirical evidence that can be brought 
on” these explanations and state that “the empirical work seems to largely accept the paternalism 
theory and move on to other questions” (p. 334).  Previous studies mainly seek to explain why in-
kind benefits exist in the first place, while from an empirical viewpoint the next step is to explain 
the variation in the choice of redistributive measures across countries and over time. 
 This paper takes this next step by testing the influence of two variables that have been 
neglected both in the theoretical and empirical literature on in-kind redistribution. We hypothesize 
that left-wing governments opt for a smaller in-kind share of social benefits than centrist and right-
wing governments because they are more concerned that benefit recipients are stigmatized. In 
addition, we argue that inflation shifts the choice of redistributive measures towards in-kind benefits 
when left-wing governments are in power as they want to shield their constituency – typically the 
poorer sections of society – from inflation. 
 
 
2. Hypotheses 
The existing empirical literature on partisan biases in social policy investigates the influence of 
government ideology on welfare state size (Allan and Scruggs, 2004). The question whether there 
are partisan biases in the choice of redistributive measures has so far been ignored. We suspect that 
there are such biases given that in-kind benefits create welfare stigma1. Hence, left-wing parties that 
are interested in protecting their constituency in order to get re-elected are likely to provide a higher 
share of social benefits in cash than centrist and right-wing governments.  
                                                          
1
 Moffitt (1983) defines welfare stigma as the “disutility arising from (observable) participation in a welfare program” (p. 
1023). For example, when poor people pay with food stamps in supermarkets or when they reside in public housing 
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 An explanation for the converse statement (a higher in-kind share of social benefits under 
centrist and right-wing governments) is that politicians of centrist and right-wing parties may be 
more prejudiced against and more suspicious about transfer recipients. Some of them even appear to 
expect benefit recipients to spend transfers on cigarettes and alcohol rather than their childrens’ 
education.2 Both lines of reasoning imply: 
 
 
H1:  Left-wing governments opt for a lower in-kind share of social benefits than centrist and right-
wing governments. 
 
 
A second hypothesis addresses the question whether governments respond to inflation by changing 
the relative emphasis placed on in-kind and cash transfers. This conjecture is based on the 
conventional wisdom that especially the poor are vulnerable to rising prices (Al-Marhubi, 1997; 
Easterly and Fischer, 2001). A government concerned about benefit recipients may find it difficult 
to constantly increase the nominal value of cash transfers to keep up with inflation and therefore 
chooses a higher in-kind share. This implies: 
 
H2: Left-wing governments raise the in-kind share of social benefits in response to inflation. 
 
 
3. Data and methodology 
The dynamic panel data estimations for 32 OECD countries over the 1980-2007 period (five-year 
averages)3 are based on the following specification:  
 
In-kind benefit shareit = αi + βIn-kind benefit shareit-1 + γLeft-wingit + δInflationit  
       + ζLeft-wingit*Inflationit + ηXit+ µt + εit,                                        (1) 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
projects, other people can observe their status as benefit recipients. 
2
 To give an example, in 2008 Philipp Missfelder, chairman of the youth organization of the conservative German CDU, 
argued that an increase in cash benefits would give a boost to liquor and cigarette sales 
(http://www.zeit.de/online/2009/08/missfelder-tabak-hartz-4). 
3
 Five-year averages reduce measurement error and allow us to take into account that changes in the political choices of 
redistributive measures take some time to show effect. The first and the last period comprise four years. 
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where iα (with i = 1, 2, 3…, 32)4 and tµ (with t = 1, 2, …, 6) are the country and time fixed effects. 
itε  is the error term.  
For the dependent variable, we use data on in-kind shares of social expenditures from the 
OECD SOCX Database.5 In order to account for the persistence of the dependent variable and to 
capture dynamic effects, we include a lagged dependent variable.  
To test hypothesis 1, our estimations rely on a measure for the ideology of the chief executive’s 
party by Beck et al. (2001). This widely used index classifies governments as right-wing, centrist or 
left-wing in terms of economic policy as follows: “Right: for parties that are defined as 
conservative, Christian democratic, or right-wing; left: for parties that are defined as communist, 
socialist, social democratic, or left-wing; center for parties that are defined as centrist or when party 
position can best be described as centrist (e.g. party advocates strengthening private enterprise in a 
social-liberal context).” (Keefer, 2010).  
Since centrist parties are rare and we do not have any priors regarding differences in the choice 
of redistributive measures between right-wing and centrist parties, we use them jointly as the 
reference category. This means that the explanatory variable Left-wingit is 1 for left-wing 
governments and 0 otherwise. One robustness check tests for potential differences by adding a 
Centristit dummy. To test hypothesis 2, we include inflation rates from the OECD Key Economic 
Indicators and their interaction with government ideology.6 
 The vector of control variables Xit contains five variables. First, we include the total volume of 
social expenditures. We expect a negative relationship between welfare state size and in-kind 
redistribution if governments cover the most basic needs such as housing, health care and food with 
in-kind transfers to ensure the survival of recipients. With a growing welfare state, the government 
provides additional benefits in cash. Second, the estimations control for real GDP per capita (in 
                                                          
4
 Switzerland and Germany are the two OECD countries that are not included for reasons of data availability. 
5
 Social expenditure data from the OECD comprise expenditures in the following domains: old age, health, incapacity, 
family, unemployment, survivors, and housing. For further information see OECD (2011). 
6
 In line with Baskaran (2012), we transform the inflation rate to p = [inflation rate/(1 + inflation rate)] to address the fact 
that some countries have very large inflation rates during the sample period, which may unduly influence the estimates. 
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thousands) based on Bearse et al.’s (2000) argument that poor countries rely more strongly on in-
kind redistribution.7 Third, we include a measure of openness (trade/GDP) as previous studies have 
emphasized the role of globalization for social policy, especially regarding the insurance function of 
the welfare state (Rodrik, 1998). Fourth, Xit includes unemployment rates since unemployment 
benefits are exclusively paid in cash. Finally, we use a measure of population density 
(inhabitants/km2) to account for the fact that the degree of social cohesion may affect social policy.8  
We estimate equation (1) using the system GMM estimator which performs better in the case 
of a persistent dependent variable than the difference GMM estimator (see Arellano and Bover, 
1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). The OLS estimator is ill-suited since the simultaneous inclusion of 
a lagged dependent variable and fixed effects gives rise to biases (Nickell, 1981) when T is smaller 
than 30 (Judson and Owen, 1999). 
 
4. Results 
Table 1 reports the estimation results. Models (1) to (3) are the baseline estimations where the main 
explanatory variables that we are interested in are included successively. Models (4) to (6) represent 
three robustness checks that in turn use lag restrictions to address the “too many instruments 
problem” (Roodman, 2009), that treat our main explanatory variables as endogenous and that add a 
centrist government dummy to test for differences within the group of non-left-wing parties. The 
highly significant lagged dependent variable points towards persistence in the dependent variable 
that justifies our dynamic specification and the use of the system GMM estimator. The high p-
values for the Hansen J-statistic indicate that the instruments are valid. Finally, as expected there is 
first-order autocorrelation and no evidence for second-order autocorrelation. 
 
                                                          
7
 Bearse et al.‘s (2000) model assumes that poor countries differ from rich countries in terms of a less productive tax 
collection technology leading to a low quality of public service. Since this may induce top-income earners in poor 
countries to opt out of the public service, the median voter pre-emptively allocates a larger share of the public budget to 
in-kind redistribution rather than redistribution in cash. 
8
 Sources: Penn World Tables, OECD Macro Trade Indicators and Economic Outlook, and World Development Indicators 
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Table 1. System GMM estimations 
Dependent variable: 
In-kind benefit share 
Baseline estimations Robustness checks 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged dependent variable 0.942*** 0.956*** 0.954*** 1.012*** 0.994*** 0.972*** 
 
(14.393) (14.934) (15.168) (16.261) (21.353) (20.062) 
Left-wing government -0.292  -4.951** -5.244* -10.068** -5.354** 
 
(-0.568)  (-1.976) (-1.756) (-2.452) (-2.163) 
Inflation rate  -1.126 -1.498** -2.189*** -4.314** -1.533** 
 
 (-1.169) (-1.984) (-2.937) (-2.310) (-2.176) 
Left-wing government 
*Inflation rate 
  6.191* 6.771* 12.415** 6.413** 
  (1.872) (1.712) (2.415) (1.966) 
Centrist government      5.280 
 
     (0.685) 
Centrist government  
*Inflation rate 
     
-9.105 
     (-0.857) 
Social expenditures/GDP -0.006 -0.003 0.003 0.051 0.026 -0.005 
 
(-0.113) (-0.071) (0.068) (0.886) (0.454) (-0.120) 
Real GDP per capita 0.018    0.012 0.024 0.030 0.020    0.031 
 
(0.506) (0.346) (0.694) (0.850) (0.547) (0.892) 
Openness 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.007 
 
(0.383) (0.644) (0.499) (0.565) (0.860) (1.208) 
Unemployment rate 0.081 0.085 0.079 0.076 0.077 0.052 
 
(0.992) (1.065) (1.061) (0.915) (0.987) (0.701) 
Population density -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005** -0.003* 
 
(-0.817) (-1.209) (-1.311) (-1.641) (-1.969) (-1.802) 
Observations 120 123 120 120 120 120 
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.448 0.446 0.478 0.281 0.598 0.226 
AR(1)-test (p-value) 0.026 0.024 0.037 0.034 0.036 0.052 
AR(2)-test (p-value) 0.918 0.762 0.847 0.885 0.791 0.802 
Instruments 21 21 23 17 29 25 
a. Hypothesis tests based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
b. Stars indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***) 
c. z-statistics in parentheses 
d. Inflation rate rescaled as p = [Inflation/(1+ Inflation)] 
e. Left-wing and centrist government measure the share of years that left-wing or centrist parties were in power  in each five-year period 
f. Model (4) uses a lag restriction; model (5) additionally treats the three covariates of interest as endogenous; model (6) includes the 
centrist government dummy and its interaction with inflation 
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From the baseline estimations we can infer that when included separately neither the left-wing 
government dummy nor the inflation rate have a significant influence on the share of in-kind 
redistribution. However, in the complete specification of model (3), the coefficients for the base 
effects and the interaction term are significant at the 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. With zero 
inflation, the negative left-wing government coefficient implies that left-wing governments put a 
stronger emphasis on cash benefits than non-left-wing governments as argued in hypothesis 1. In 
addition, right-wing and centrist governments respond to inflation by decreasing the in-kind share of 
social benefits. In the absence of appropriate inflation-indexation of benefits this would imply a cut 
in real social expenditures under non-left-wing governments. Finally, the positive interaction term 
suggests that left-wing governments react to inflation by increasing the share of in-kind benefits 
which confirms our second hypothesis. 
The first robustness check re-estimates model (3) using only the first lags as instruments. 
The results are virtually unchanged except that the inflation coefficient is now even significant at 
the 1 percent level. Model (5) additionally treats the three explanatory variables of interest as 
endogenous. Again, the results are qualitatively the same as in the baseline. Finally, model (6) 
extends model (3) by including a centrist dummy and its interaction with the inflation rate. Both are 
insignificant, while the results for the other covariates are unchanged. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper addresses the dearth of research on the determinants of in-kind redistribution by testing 
the influence of partisan biases and inflation. Based on system GMM estimations, we find that left-
wing governments exhibit a stronger preference for cash transfers than right-wing and centrist 
governments. In addition, our results suggest that inflation plays a critical role in this relationship. 
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